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INTRODUCTION

After I finished reading Professor Baldus' (and colleagues') report,
Arbitrariness and Discriminationin the Administration of the Death
Penalty: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis of the Nebraska Experience
(1973-1999),1 I spent a great deal of time deciding how a research psychologist such as myself could best respond to this thorough analysis
of the manner in which homicide cases have been adjudicated in the
Nebraska state courts. A number of possible approaches emerged in
my thinking. First, there was the work's contribution to scientific theory and the accumulation of knowledge, the bottom line for all empirical investigations. A psychologist must ask about the contribution
that any individual study makes to the accumulation of scientific theory and facts, in this case, the way in which sentencing decisions are
reached in first degree murder trials. Sentencing decisions influence
and are influenced by human thought, affect, and action. As a psychologist, I am interested in what the Baldus team's Nebraska homicide data tell us about the psychology of sentencing (i.e., the role of
cognition, attitude, and affect) in the process by which judges impose
punishments upon defendants. The Baldus team collected an enor© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Psychology and Director of the Law and Psychology Program at the
University of Nebraska at Lincoln; Cleveland State University; Ph.D., University
of Houston; M.L.S., University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
1. 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002) [hereinafter Nebraska Study].
*
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mous amount of data.2 They coded details from a variety of difficult to
interpret sources for 185 death-eligible decisions. The sample defines
the existing capital murder universe of defendants for the period between 1973 and 1999.3 The outcomes of Nebraska prosecutors' determinations of whether to seek the death penalty and the outcomes of
judicial sentencing in cases where the prosecutors asked for the death
penalty are well documented in this work. The overall strength of the
project lays in the external validity of the study, that is, the ability to
generalize the findings beyond the current sample of cases, prosecutors, judges, offenders, and periods of time. In that sense, the Baldus
and colleagues' study is the final word on death sentencing in Nebraska as it was practiced before the Supreme Court's holding in Ring
4
v. Arizona.
This point, of course, brings me to the second way in which I could
make my comments, that is by addressing the way in which this empirical report impacts the legal analysis of the capital murder scheme
in Nebraska, which unlike most other states that make the death penalty available for first-degree murder, assigns the burden of deciding
5
whether to impose the death penalty to trial judges and not to jurors.
From a psychologist's point of view, this process results in an extremely interesting judgment and decision task for the single judge or
the three-judge panel charged with evaluating the facts in any given
case to determine how to assign punishment.
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court also considered
the principles of punishment and sentencing when they ruled in Ring.
The Court held that Arizona's penalty scheme in capital murder trials
was in violation of the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of a jury trial
because Arizona judges, and not jurors, determined whether statutory
aggravating circumstances existed. 6 The finding of aggravating circumstances is what makes the defendant eligible for the death penalty. The holding in Ring will require changes in the way Nebraska
courts try capital murder cases and the way in which sentencing decisions are reached. 7 As a psychologist, I am interested in whether the
data reported in the Baldus study8 will assist the state legislature to
revise its capital murder scheme, not only to meet the newly articulated standards of Ring, but also to improve the quality of the decision
process in Nebraska's homicide dispositions. At the outset, I found
Justice Ginsburg's legal analysis in Ring compelling. Nonetheless, I
2. Id.
3. Id. at 496.
4. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (Reissue 1995).

6. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
7. Id.
8. Nebraska Study, supra note 1.
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believe that this case represents a lost opportunity to use social science and psychological data to examine the homicide sentencing decisions of judges and juries. An important question to consider is
whether the Nebraska Legislature can make use of empirical data (in
this case the Baldus team's findings) to analyze its current sentencing
scheme in capital murder trials in a way that the Supreme Court was
unable or unwilling to do in its analysis in Ring.
A third approach to commenting on the Baldus team's study is to
go beyond what it tells us about substantive policy recommendations
and to learn from it more about the way in which social scientists
might use empirical investigations to make policy recommendations.
The findings reported in this piece have implications for the ways in
which Nebraska's legislature might adjust its sentencing scheme to
promote consistency and efficiency while staying within the guidelines
of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It also offers an
example of how one group of scholars used empirical data to reach
conclusions about homicide dispositions in state court. As a psychologist, I would be remiss not to comment on the methodological
strengths and weaknesses of the Baldus team's research. The methodological rigor in the research forms the basis to evaluate the reliability and validity of the groups' conclusions. Unfortunately, in all
empirical investigations there are tradeoffs that investigators cannot
avoid. That is, they "buy" protections against certain types of potential errors by relaxing methodological rigor in other areas and as a
result increase risk of other types of methodological ills. For this reason, the soundest empirical conclusions emerge from programs of research that combine maximally different methodological tools. It is
therefore important to understand what the Baldus team's data can
say (with utmost scientific confidence) about the disposition of homicide cases in Nebraska.
Without doubt, the most profitable analysis of the Baldus team's
findings would require a careful review of its implications for the substantive accumulation of scientific knowledge, the Sixth Amendment's
requirements for jury trials, the Eighth Amendment's requirement
that sentencing not be arbitrary and capricious, 9 and its contribution
to the empirical analysis of policy. The unabridged version of such an
analysis would rival the page length of the original paper and would
take this symposium far from the purposes that its editors intended.
Nonetheless, an abridged version will at least need to ask three sets of
questions of the most significant findings in the report. For each of
these findings I will raise two questions about the theory and accumulation of findings: 1) How do the findings relate to what we know
about decisionmaking in capital crimes? and 2) What do the finding
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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tell us about the way in which judges (and other decisionmakers) draw
inferences about legal issues relevant to the dispositions of homicide
cases? With regard to the social implications of the empirical and legal analysis in the report, I will ask two questions of the findings: 1)
Do the findings have implications for how people think, feel, or behave
in legal contexts? and 2) Do the findings have the potential to impact
the social world beyond the policy implications that the author's discussed? Finally, I will inquire about the methodology of this impressive policy analysis and ask: 1) What are the methodological
strengths and weaknesses of each of the findings? 2) What are the
limitations of the methodology? and 3) How could alternative approaches add to the findings?
If I applied this analysis to each of the thirteen or fourteen important and interesting findings of this long and impressive empirical report, I would once again exceed the original article in page length. I
would certainly take this piece beyond its circumscribed purpose, to
raise some issues that the authors of the empirical work may reflect
upon in order to push their own thinking in directions that they might
not have considered going and, as a result, help interpret the meaning
and significance of this important piece of work. The work is detailed
and the analyses are complex. As suggested above, the Baldus group's
research is the final word on death sentencing in Nebraska as it was
practiced from 1977 to 1999. However, the cost of collecting existing
archival data at this level of detail is that it limits the researcher to
asking questions that are answerable only by the types of variables
that are available in the existing data archives.
Psychologists refer to this as an issue of construct validity. The
question becomes does the study sample broadly not only over time,
people, and places-or time, jurisdictions, courtrooms, judges, and offenders in this case-but also whether the researcher has sampled
broadly across the kinds of questions that are interesting in the study
of sentencing. Such factors might include but are not limited to questions about:
1. the attitudinal and ideological beliefs of the judges,
2. the affective responses of the judges to the fact patterns as offered during the hearings,
3. the attitudes, ideological beliefs, and strategies of the attorneys
that represented the offenders,
4. the style and content of the attorneys' arguments during the
hearing,
5. the affective reactions of the offenders during the hearing,
6. the reactions of the local communities to the possible aggravating and mitigating factors as portrayed in the media (and the judge's
awareness of these factors).
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In defense of the construct validity of this study, the consistency
analyses demonstrated that the judges in these cases were as consistent in finding the "worst of the worst" as were the juries in New
Jersey, a state the Baldus team argues to be comparable to Nebraska,
but one in which juries make sentencing decisions in capital trials.1O
At the same time, this same set of analyses shows that there was in an
absolute sense some degree of variability among "near neighbor" offenders in Nebraska.l Finally, the overall regression analysis shows
reasonable predictability of outcome, but it still leaves a great deal of
room for a sizable number of undiscovered predictors of judicial decisionmaking. In other words, while the strength of the relationships
between predictors and outcomes in the regression analyses were
moderate, a substantial amount of outcome variability (i.e., life or
death) remained unaccounted for. Therefore, we can only presume
that there are other non-included factors which might also predict significant components of the dispositions in these cases. As a psychologist, I suspect that many of the constructs not sampled that would add
to the explained variability in the study are likely to be psychological
factors, most of which were not measured or estimated in this sample.
I cannot help but wonder more about how the judges made the decisions that they did and how the psychology of the attorneys, offenders,
and community shaped the judgment outcomes.
However, I digress and will return to my self-assigned task. I intend to review several major findings in the study with the intent of
raising some questions for discussion and further elaboration by the
Baldus team. At the time of the oral presentation of the paper and the
resulting reactions made by the invited commentators, I was faced
with the impossible job of determining which findings were less important and could therefore be left out of my analysis. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court came to my rescue in its summer 2002 term, when it
held in Ring v. Arizona 12 that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
trial by jury prohibits judges sitting alone from finding aggravating
circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty. The logic
followed in Ring highlights the importance of how judges and jurors
use aggravating and mitigating circumstances to reach penalty
decisions.
In a prior case, Walton v. Arizona, 13 the Court held that because
aggravating factors were "sentencing considerations" and not "elements of the offense," Arizona's sentencing scheme did not curtail a
defendant's right to a jury verdict. The Walton Court held that Arizona's statute asked judges to consider whether to "place a substan10.
11.
12.
13.

Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 656-58.

Id.
122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002).
497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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tive limitation on sentencing,"14 the effect of which was to guide the
"choice between life and death"'s and not to make findings of fact with
regard to an "element of the crime of capital murder"16 (aggravation is
not an element of first-degree murder in Arizona). However, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,17 the Supreme Court ruled that a sentencing
judge was prohibited from making a factual finding that the defendant's crime "had been motivated by racial animus,"18 thus triggering
New Jersey's hate crime enhancement, which had the effect of doubling the defendant's maximum prison sentence. In Ring, the Justices
reasoned, "[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter
how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt."19 The Court said the issue was "not one of form, but of effect."20 Writing for the majority in Ring, Justice Ginsberg came to the
conclusion that if the Sixth Amendment forbids a trial judge to decide
an issue of fact that results in an enhancement of a penalty without a
factual finding by a jury, then surely a judge sitting without a jury
may not find aggravation in a capital murder case to impose the death
penalty. 21 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the prohibition stands
even if the finding of fact is not an "element of the crime" but is instead merely a "sentencing consideration." 2 2 Therefore, Ring overruled Walton "to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting
without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for im23
position of the death penalty."
The holding in Ring is a narrow one in that it makes illegal the
sentencing schemes in the five states that assign the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska). 2 4 However, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurring opinion, the ruling in Ring seemingly does not preclude
states from allowing judges to determine whether to impose the death
penalty in cases where aggravation is made an element of the crime to
25
be determined by the jury in the guilt phase of capital murder trials.
Therefore, if a state like Nebraska required its juries to determine
whether aggravation existed beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2439.
Id.
Id. at 2430.
Id. at 2443.
Id. at 2438.
Id. at 2443.
Id. at 2442 n.6.
Id. at 2445.
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phase of capital murder trials, it could still leave the trial judges to
balance the aggravation against any mitigation to reach a final sentence and decide whether to impose the death penalty.
In light of these considerations, the Baldus group's findings regarding how judges use aggravation and mitigation become exceedingly interesting and important for purposes of considering possible
ways to reform Nebraska's capital murder scheme. Accordingly, African American homicide defendants are more likely to face the possibility of the death penalty as a result of differences in prosecutors' use of
their discretion in the urban, as opposed to rural, areas of Nebraska
(i.e., urban prosecutors are more likely to seek the death penalty) coupled with the fact that most Blacks live in urbanized Nebraska counties. 26 It appears that the judges' more balanced use of aggravation
and mitigation offsets the disadvantages suffered by Black defendants 27 so that the Baldus group's findings of how judges use specific
aggravating factors, the number of aggravating factors, their use of
specific mitigation, and the number of mitigating factors are central to
considerations of reform.
Not all the Justices in Ring embraced a narrow interpretation of
the prohibition against judicial decisionmaking in capital murder
cases. Justice Breyer came to the same conclusion that the Constitution forbids judges to act alone to find aggravation that could trigger a
death sentence by a very different route. He argued that, "the Eighth
Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to
sentence a defendant to death."28 Justice Breyer concluded that its
retributive function prevents the death penalty from constituting
cruel and unusual punishment. He reached this conclusion by citing
the empirical literature, which calls into serious doubt the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent of homicide, by assuming that
the death penalty is not necessary to incapacitate beyond the sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of probation or parole, and by
observing that rehabilitation is obviously not a purpose of the death
penalty. Justice Breyer argued, "[with] respect to retribution, jurors
possess an important comparative advantage over judges. In principle, they are more attuned to the 'community's moral sensibility' because they 'reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of
the community as a whole.'" 29 Of course, Breyer's reasoning implies
that jurors will be able to make these determinations by taking into
consideration the qualities of criminal actions and not irrational factors that might bias the decision process. Advocates of judicial sen26.
27.
28.
29.

Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 623-26.
Id. at 656-58.
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2446.
Id. at 2447 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 477, 481, 486 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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tencing in death penalty cases, individuals who might favor reform
that maintains the role of judges in assigning the death penalty, after
first allowing juries to determine aggravation in the guilt phase of a
trial, would likely take solace in the suggestion that judges are less
arbitrary decisionmakers than jurors. In fact, Arizona made this very
claim, suggesting the superiority of judicial sentencing in Ring.3O The
Court rejected the argument because "the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right, however, does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or
efficiency of potential factfinders."31 Still, legislative reformers might
conclude that Nebraska trial judges will be less arbitrary in evaluations of mitigation when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Interestingly, the Baldus group found that the socioeconomic
status of the homicide victims influenced the decisions of the Nebraska judges. 32 Judges were more likely to impose the death penalty
against defendants convicted of killing victims higher in socioeconomic status. 33 These considerations suggest that the Baldus group's
findings regarding victim socioeconomic status are another significant
factor for the Legislatures to consider when reviewing future reforms
to Nebraska's capital murder scheme. I turn now to these findings to
consider each from a psychological point of view.
II.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS AS PREDICTORS OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE OUTCOMES
The findings of the regressionanalysis and the individual indicatoranalyses
in the Baldus group's study show that some (e.g., contract murder and prior
record of serious assault),but not all aggravatingfactors (e.g. victim is a police
officer and motive to hindergovernment function) were significantpredictors of
the death sentence outcomes among death-eligible defendants.

These data would seem to imply that judges, if not prosecutors,
weigh more heavily some very specific aggravating factors to the relative exclusion of others. From a purely psychological point of view, I
am interested in why judges weigh some aggravating factors more
than others. What is it about a contract murder that commands so
much attention? Why is it more important than multiple victims or
even the heinousness of the crime? Is this an affective reaction, one
made relatively automatically with little deliberation or is it a cold
cognition, which requires considerable deliberation and thought? Perhaps, it exposes a political position that reflects the decisionmaker's
perception of public opinion, if not the reality of the public's collective
view of homicide. Is there a theory of justice that emerges from an
understanding of how specific aggravating factors act in the minds of
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 2442.
Id.
Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 609.
Id.
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judges and prosecutors? Does the public assign similar weights to
these aggravating circumstances? Is there congruence between the
judges' and the lay public's theory of aggravation? These questions
are important from a purely theoretical point of view because their
answers are necessary for developing a model to describe and explain
how judges, and perhaps prosecutors, reach judgments about the
"deathworthiness" of defendants. However, it is not possible to answer these questions only with the archival data that the Baldus team
collected. The answers to these issues require, at the very least, additional measures of affect, attitude, and perceived seriousness of the
crimes adjudicated and evaluated from the archive. While such data
would not be easy to collect because it would require judges and/or
prosecutors to complete rating scales for each case that they process
(preferably prior to the time that they reach final decisions), they are
necessary to build a more complete theory of how sentences are
reached in capital murder cases. From a scientific perspective, the
legislatures (in this case the Nebraska Legislature) and the courts
could come to a more rational set of conclusions about the ability of
judges and prosecutors to follow the law without bias, if they possessed this type of information.
Unfortunately, following the Ring ruling, it will not be possible to
collect this type of data from judges trying capital murder cases; however, they could be collected from prosecutors deciding whether or not
to seek the death penalty. A study that included prosecutors' ratings
of attitudes, affective reactions, and the specific political responses to
each homicide case would nicely supplement the Baldus group's data.
The results of this study would be especially interesting if the researcher collected a matching public sample to compare and contrast
with findings that explained how prosecutors (and perhaps defense attorneys) view homicide cases. In the post-Ring reform debates, these
data would certainly be helpful to Nebraska and other states' legislators who will be trying to reshape sentencing schemes to be consistent
with the demands of the Sixth Amendment.
The Baldus data invite further investigation into the process by
which judges, prosecutors, and even defense attorneys use aggravating circumstances. I wonder if specific aggravating circumstances ac34
tivate automatic, perhaps inescapable affective reactions in judges,
prosecutors, and very likely jurors, which result in immediate, nondeliberative judgments of deathworthiness. The test of this hypothesis would require an experiment in which researchers manipulate information regarding specific aggravating circumstances (i.e., present
different forms of the information to different decisionmakers) within
an otherwise unchanging set of case facts. Measures would include
34. See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The UnbearableAutomaticity of Being,
54 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999).
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much more than the participants' final sentencing recommendations.
They would include ratings of affect, attitudes, elements of the crime,
and perhaps, some more sophisticated reaction time measures to distinguish implicit from explicit reactions to the heinousness of the
events. These types of data are in the domain of experimental psychologists. Hopefully, the Baldus group's data will stimulate psychologists to work on a theory of how judges, prosecutors, and jurors reach
sentencing decisions, and whether some aggravating factors elicit automatic, inescapable reactions. As far as I know, this work has not
been done and it would likely have an important theoretical and practical significance in light of the direction that capital murder legislation will take post-Ring. Psychological research has focused much
more on the role of mitigation than aggravation in death penalty
35
sentences.
The fact that some aggravating factors are weighed more heavily
than others in Nebraska cases is of enormous social significance for
attorneys and trial consultants at least in Nebraska and perhaps in
other jurisdictions as well. The value of these findings before Ring
was indisputable. Trial consultants and attorneys on both sides of
these cases could have used the outcomes of the Baldus analyses to
evaluate specific cases with an eye toward understanding the best way
to argue those cases. Trial consultants or attorneys might have used
these data to either highlight or offset the most discriminating aggravating factors, depending upon the side they represented. However,
the Ring holding makes these data much less useful from a trial management point of view because they may say very little about the way
in which such factors influence jurors who will now be required to
evaluate aggravating factors before either a jury or a judge can impose
the death penalty.
Finally, most psychologists could not avoid commenting on the
methodological strengths and weaknesses that go to the interpretability of these results. As discussed earlier, the overwhelming strength
of the Baldus group's Nebraska study is the external validity
strengthened, in part, by the exhaustive effort through which the researchers sampled all relevant death penalty cases heard over an extended period of time. They are to be commended for their efforts.
Their coding of aggravation, mitigation, and salient factors shows extensive detail. I have done a number of projects that involved coding
these types of variables and I congratulate these researchers for their
perseverance. The richness of the data set is a major strength of the
study.
35. Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases: The
Role of Declarativeand ProceduralKnowledge, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming) (analyzing jury discretion in penalty phases of murder trials).
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In the psychological literature, this type of content analysis of case
files would normally be accompanied by a testing of the psychometric
properties of the resulting variables. The issue of inter-coder agreement stands out as one that could present some reliability difficulties
in the Baldus team's analysis of aggravating factors. It is that some
aggravating circumstances were more easily identified in these cases
than were others. For example, assume for the moment that the coders had an easier time evaluating whether a case included a contract
murder than evaluating whether the case included the heinousness of
the defendant's actions as an aggravating circumstance. If this were
the case, then the reliability (i.e., the lack of random error) associated
with contract killing would be much greater than that for ratings of
heinousness. The resulting differential reliability could be a plausible
rival hypothesis for the heavy weight that judges and prosecutors
seemed to place on contract murders relative to simple heinousness.
One could go further and ask whether the construct validity of abstract factors such as heinousness is sufficiently supported in the coding scheme. Heinousness as an aggravating factor is not as well
defined in the law as is a contract killing. It therefore follows that in
at least some cases it might have been difficult for the Baldus coders
to accurately determine whether heinousness was a factor at issue.
Under these conditions, the presence or absence of heinousness as an
aggravating factor (relative to the presence or absence of say a contract murder) may have less predictive power because it was difficult
to determine in which cases heinousness appeared as an aggravating
factor. This argument could be extended to the measurement of other
aggravating factors as well. It is this type of measurement problem
that makes large scale archival research projects so difficult to
complete.
Finally, there is the issue of causation and correlation. As is the
case in all correlational studies of legal decisionmaking (i.e., those
that do not manipulate independent variables), it is difficult to establish that the predictor of interest (here, the presence or absence of single or multiple aggravating factors), and not some other third variable
factor that is correlated with the predictor variable of interest, is the
determinant of the decision outcome. It is also difficult to determine
the direction of the causal flow to decide which correlate is most likely
the cause of the other. Undoubtedly, the Baldus group favors an interpretation in which the judges used the specific aggravating factors
that are significantly related to the penalty outcomes to reach sentencing decisions, but it is also possible that other unmeasured and
undetected issues were systematically related to the aggravating factors. Factors such as motivation of the defendants and victims, relationship between the defendants and victims, history of the
defendants' behaviors, and childhood backgrounds of the defendants
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might very well be correlated with aggravating factors such as the heinousness of the crime or the presence of other victims. Further, it is
also possible that the judges used the aggravating factors to justify the
sentencing decisions that they had already reached, rather than as
the input into the calculus that produced the judgment outcomes. To
the Baldus groups' credit, they measured many other third variable
factors and tried to statistically control for them in either regression
analyses or multiple contingency table breakdowns. However, as the
authors point out, small sample sizes limit the usefulness of multivariate statistics as a technique to control confounding factors by
measuring them and including them in a statistical model.36
Despite these concerns, these data and the reported analyses of
their contribution to judicial decisionmaking in capital murder cases
provide our best estimates of the way in which judges made pre-Ring
sentencing decisions. The major point that I make is that single methodologies distort results in knowable ways and require confirmation
with alternative approaches. Psychologists could play an important
role in testing the conclusions of the Baldus group by designing studies that present and manipulate, under controlled conditions, the specific aggravating factors that were significant predictors in the Baldus
groups' regression analyses. Researchers could ask a sample of judges
and prosecutors to evaluate cases that are identical except with variations in the combinations of aggravating factors present in the fact
patterns. If we find the same relationship between manipulated aggravating factors and sentencing judgments as reported in the Baldus
group's Nebraska study, then we can feel much more confident about
the weights that decisionmakers assigned to each of the aggravating
circumstances in their capital murder sentencing decisions.
III.

NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS, MITIGATION, AND
PREDICTING DEATH SENTENCES
The findings of the regression analysis and the individual indicatoranalyses
in the Baldus group's study show that as the number of aggravatingfactors in
cases increase, the offender is more likely to receive a death sentence. This
seems to be true despite the fact that neither individual mitigatingfactors nor
the number of mitigating factors are significantly related to case outcome.

This finding is disquieting, but not unexpected. The jury decisionmaking literature regarding sentencing in capital murder trials shows
that jurors have a difficult time evaluating mitigating circumstances. 3 7 In fact, several studies demonstrated that jurors do not un36. Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 535-36.
37.

See generally James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the

Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 16 L. &
Hum. BEHAV. 203 (1992); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and
Death Matters: A PreliminaryStudy of California'sCapital Penalty Instructions,
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derstand what mitigating circumstances actually are. 38 Other studies
show that jurors confuse specific mitigating circumstances and treat
them as aggravating factors. 39 Some sentencing jurors seem to treat
the offender's earlier life successes in socially appropriate enterprises
as if they were aggravating factors, reasoning that because the defendant led a successful prior life, he should have known better as an
adult. 40 One study found that instead of balancing aggravation and
mitigation as the law requires, mock jurors weighed independently
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, allowing each to make
its own contribution to the sentence. 4 1 In this study, research participants failed to use mitigation to offset the effects of aggravation. 4 2 In
other words, the mock jurors weighed aggravation separately from
mitigation to reach sentencing judgments.
It is, of course, unlikely that the judges and prosecutors do not understand the concepts of aggravation and mitigation. Furthermore,
the Nebraska data suggest that the judges consciously believe that the
law in Nebraska requires them to consider the totality of the aggravation in a case and not just the number of aggravators. Yet, the findings are very clear that as the number of aggravating factors grow in
number the death penalty is more and more likely to be imposed regardless of the mitigation considered individually, considered as the
total number of mitigating factors, or considered as the totality of the
circumstances. 4 3 This leads to an implicit rule in Nebraska which
might read something like, "a death penalty is almost a sure bet with
three or more aggravating factors but is a close call, depending upon
other factors, with less than two aggravating factors."
The critical question becomes how judges reach decisions in cases
where there are fewer than three aggravating factors. The data, as
they exist, do seem to suggest that decisionmakers take mitigation
into consideration with low levels of aggravation, but the findings are

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 411 (1994); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and
Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase
Closing Arguments, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 575 (1997); Richard L. Wiener et al.,
The Role of Declarativeand ProceduralKnowledge in CapitalMurder Sentencing,
28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 124 (1998); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 455 (1995); Wiener et al., supra note 35.
See generally Luginbuhl, supra note 37.
Haney & Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional
Comprehensionand Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, supra note 37.
Craig Haney et al., Deciding To Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudenceof Death, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 149 (1994).
Wiener et al., The Role of Declarative and ProceduralKnowledge in CapitalMurder Sentencing, supra note 37.
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Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 548-62.
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not significant and the sample sizes are rather small. 44 The uncomfortable conclusion that survives is that it is not at all clear how sentencing decisions were reached when there were fewer than three
aggravating factors. Perhaps the psychological constructs that I outlined above (e.g., affect, motivation, attitude, ideology) determined the
sentence when aggravation was low to moderate. If these factors did
come into play, one could ask whether they did so implicitly (i.e., below the level of awareness) or explicitly (i.e., with deliberation)?
Once again, I see the need for some experimental work that
manipulates under controlled circumstances the number of aggravating circumstances and the number and type of mitigating circumstances in the context of case descriptions derived from the fact
patterns in some of the Nebraska cases analyzed in the Baldus report.
Of particular interest in these experiments would be the interaction of
strength of aggravation and strength of mitigation. If prosecutors and
judges follow the law, then strong enough mitigation should offset aggravation, when aggravation reaches some "deathworthy" threshold.
Below that threshold mitigation is irrelevant to the sentencing process. A defendant is eligible for the death penalty only after serious
enough aggravation is found beyond a reasonable doubt and only then
should mitigation become part of the decision calculus. The experimental work that I would recommend would include measures of affective reactions, attitudes toward punishment, and scales of political
ideology to begin to estimate the effects of these factors in the Nebraska's capital murder calculus.
Following Ring, the focus of this work should be expanded to include mock jury experiments that investigate the way in which aggravation, mitigation, and psychological factors (i.e., comprehension of
jury instructions, affective reactions to the fact patterns, attitudes toward punishment, and political ideologies) interact to produce sentencing decisions among prosecutors, judges, and jurors. The end
product of this type of work will be of enormous value to Nebraska and
other state legislatures in reforming death penalty sentencing consistent with the holding in Ring. Of equal interest from a social policy
perspective is the discrepancy between the law (both as written and as
practiced) and the implicit theories of justice that citizens use to evaluate these types of cases. For example, it would be very interesting to
find out if Nebraska jury-eligible citizens uphold the rule of three aggravators that figured prominently in judicial decisionmaking. More
generally, the comparison of survey data and experimental studies of
the decisionmaking processes of the Nebraska citizenry to the Baldus
group's results with regard to the relative roles of aggravation and
mitigation in homicide cases could be most informative to policymak44. Id. at 554.
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ers. Put simply, post-Ring reformations of the capital sentencing
calculus would likely be influenced by data that points out discrepancies between how the citizens of the state on one hand and the prosecutors and judges on the other weigh aggravation and mitigation.
From a more methodological point of view, the problem of construct
validity takes on a new dimension when one considers the addition of
non-statutory mitigating circumstances in capital murder dispositions. A mitigating circumstance can be any aspect of the crime or
characteristic of the defendant that argues for leniency in sentencing.4 5 Therefore, each non-statutory mitigating circumstance is defined largely by a subjective standard, that is by the perceptions of the
individual sentencers. The judges were not queried about the mitigating factors that they found in each case and it is difficult to code the
strength of mitigation in any case or set of cases from the official record without input from the sentencers. The Baldus group's attempts
at coding mitigation may be an accurate reflection of statutory mitigation but one can only speculate on the non-statutory sources of mitigation that the judges (and prosecutors deciding whether to seek the
death penalty) might have brought to the decision task. Perhaps, one
of the reasons for the lack of mitigation effects results from underestimating the strength of mitigation that went into the decisionmakers'
judgment calculus. My own work with juries 4 6 convinces me that the
non-statutory mitigating factors (i.e., defendant remorse, defendant
affect, victim's family affect, sentence certainty, and decisionmakers'
views of the death penalty) may very well be the most influential mitigating factors.
Still, these data do estimate the strength of aggravation and mitigation using several alternative operational definitions of those constructs. 47 However, there is little in the way of a direct measure of the
interaction between aggravation and mitigation in the analyses.
Neither the regression analyses nor the individual cross tabulation
breakdowns reported in the Baldus group's paper, test the interaction
between level of aggravation and level of mitigation. As discussed
above, this would be an interesting measure to examine, especially
post-Ring. That is, one factor that should be influential in determining whether to completely remove judges from the sentencing process
or to relegate their involvement to evaluating mitigation after aggravation is found by a jury is the way in which the judges used mitigation at different levels of aggravation. Assume that the regression
analysis produced a significant interaction between aggravation and
mitigation strength on sentencing outcomes in a way that high levels
of mitigation had some impact once aggravation was found, but low
45. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
46. Wiener et al., supra note 35.
47. Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 548-62.
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levels did not produce that effect. This pattern would suggest that the
trial judges were effective at representing, at least, the law's intention
to balance aggravation with mitigation. The results of this type of reanalysis of the Baldus team's data should be of general interest to the
Nebraska Legislature.
IV.

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF VICTIMS AND
SENTENCE OUTCOMES

The findings of the regression analysis and the individual indicatoranalyses
in the Baldus group's study show a strong effect for socioeconomic status of
to
victims. Defendants charged with killing victims with high as compared
48
low social economic status were more likely to receive the death penalty.

While the seemingly obvious explanation for this outcome is that
victims who are "valued" more in the community trigger a harsh sentence against the defendants convicted of causing their death, the reason for the need of this harsher sentence is elusive. From a
psychological point of view I suspect that this result is driven not by
rational information processing but rather by experiential processing
(emotionally driven decisionmaking).4 9 It may turn out that the
judges were angrier at the killing of high status community members
than at the killing of less highly valued citizens. Once again, the affective component remains unstudied in this data set, and an investigation of the role of affect probably requires an experimental
manipulation of socioeconomic status of the defendant assessed with
ratings of experiential processes (e.g., emotional reactions), as well as,
sentencing outcomes.
Nonetheless, it would seem that this largely descriptive finding in
the Baldus team's analysis lends considerable support to Justice
Breyer's Eighth Amendment argument in Ring v. Arizona that sentencing in capital murder cases, if it is justified by its retributive function, is best left to the juries and not judges. 50 It is doubtful that the
community values, at least as consciously and deliberately expressed,
would be consistent with a sentencing scheme that favors killers of
low status victims over killers of high status victims. While the test of
the bias awaits archival studies of actual sitting juries and/or with
experimental research that varies and presents victims of varying economic status to jury-eligible citizens, it is still the case that the ability
of judges to reflect accurately community values of retribution will always be suspect, even if the role of the trial judge is limited to consid48. Id. at 608-16.
49. See generally, Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding
Dual-ProcessTheories from the Perspectiveof Cognitive-ExperientialSelf-Theory,
in DUAL-PROCEss THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 462-482 (Sheely Chaiken &
Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
50. 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2447 (2002).
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eration of mitigating factors. Furthermore, if new capital murder
sentencing schemes limit the role of judges to evaluating mitigation
after the jury finds aggravation, the trial judges may still show socioeconomic status biases by finding stronger mitigation with low status
victims and weaker mitigation with high status victims. Unfortunately, the Baldus team's data is silent on the interaction of mitigation and socioeconomic status of the deceased (although it may be
possible to test this interaction with the Nebraska data). Therefore,
these speculations await additional data and/or additional analyses.
The implications of the socioeconomic status finding are disturbing
and any policy ameliorations are not obvious. The data suggest that
in Nebraska (and very likely in other states) bias in social status perspective exists at the very highest levels of decisionmaking. These
data do not tell us anything about decisionmaking in other areas of
the criminal justice system. We are left with unanswered questions
(questions that the Baldus team did not set out to answer) such as
how far does the bias against the value of low socioeconomic status
individuals reach? Does it generalize to jurors, legislators, police, executive officers in local and state government, and appellate level
courts? If the bias is pervasive, then there are indeed many ways in
which prejudice against the less successful in our society could be expressed at a variety of different levels in the criminal justice system.
Further, it is not at all clear how policy could be forged to rid the system of this prejudice against the less successful members of society.
One of the methodological implications of the status finding is that
the study is in fact sensitive enough to detect biases that the prosecutors and judges harbor when trying capital murder cases. That is, if
this design and these data were sensitive enough to detect one type of
bias originating with the characteristics of the homicide victims, it
lends support to the sensitivity of the Baldus group's data to find other
biases that resulted from other social attributes of the victims and
their accused murders. This brings us back to the major finding and
ultimate purpose of this research project.
V.

MINORITIES ADVANCING TO THE PENALTY PHASE IN
CAPITAL CASES

The findings of the regression analysis and the individual indicator analyses
in the Baldus group's study show some limited evidence that minorities are
more likely to advance to the death penalty stage. However, final sentencing
effects for the defendant's race, the victim's race, and various defendant and
victim race combinations are not significantwhen the level of defendant culpability and other extra-legalfactors are controlled.5 1

Prior research with this paradigm has found evidence of racial bias
in other jurisdictions. Most notable are data describing the disposi51. Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 566-90.
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tions of capital murder cases in Georgia collected by the Baldus
53
group 52 and reviewed by the Supreme Court in McKlesky v. Kemp,
which demonstrated that Black defendants who killed White victims
were most at risk for the death penalty. Also at high risk were
murders of White victims relative to Black victims regardless of the
race of the defendant. Additional data collected by the Baldus group
in Pennsylvania showed evidence of racial discrimination in capital
murder sentencing in Philadelphia.54 One cannot help but wonder
why the Nebraska results are inconsistent with the prior research in
these two other jurisdictions. Some help may come from the jury decisionmaking literature in social psychology. For example in a recent
set of experiments concerned with jury decisionmaking in general, but
not specifically with sentencing in first-degree murder cases, White
mock jurors tried to embrace an egalitarian value system and therefore only showed racial bias in cases in which there were not blatantly
salient racial issues. In cases in which the race of the defendant is a
material issue at trial (e.g., discrimination cases) White jurors do not
manifest judgments that reflect racial bias. 5 5 An evaluation of the
fact patterns in the Nebraska cases could show similar results for
judges and prosecutors. Perhaps, the race of the defendants or victims
was central to the fact patterns in enough of these cases to trigger
egalitarian decisionmaking by the judges and offset racial biases in
the statistical analyses. While this hypothesis was not tested in the
Baldus group data, some secondary analyses could explore this
explanation.
In one study conducted with mock jurors making sentencing decisions in California, the authors varied the race of the defendant experimentally and included measured juror comprehension of California
penalty phase instructions as a secondary predictor. 5 6 They found
that those jurors who poorly comprehended the instructions were
more likely to assign the death penalty to Black defendants than to
White defendants.5 7 These data suggest that individuals who do not
52.
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understand the law but who are required to impose a sentence under
conditions of uncertainty and in an emotionally charged context will
fall back on their implicit theories of justice and social order. Hence,
jurors who understand the instructions are constrained to balance aggravating and mitigating factors as the law requires. However, those
without that understanding are free to allow personal biases to dominate. Indeed, my own work with Missouri mock jurors showed high
levels of juror miscomprehension of penalty phase instructions even
after the jurors deliberated in groups to reach sentencing decisions. 58
However, when we attempted to improve comprehension by simplifying the instructions and presenting them in a flow chart format, juror
understanding increased significantly.5 9
Nebraska judges understand penalty phase law and therefore constrain their own implicit theories of justice to comply with their commitments to follow the law. Perhaps, if the jurors in Georgia and the
mock jurors in California and Missouri were presented with jury instructions that they could understand and follow, they too would follow the law and inhibit their own implicit systems of bias. If this logic
is correct, then it may very well turn out that sentencing decisions in
Nebraska following the new Ring standard for the Sixth Amendment
may very well fall prey to the same kinds of racial bias in other state
systems. This speculation is further supported by the Baldus group's
finding that Black offenders compared to White offenders in Nebraska
are more likely to advance to penalty phase trials for homicide and
that it was the judge's unprejudiced application of the law that offset
these disparate impact results in the final disposition of capital murder cases. Ironically, the results of the Baldus studies together with
the California and Missouri mock jury experiments predict that one
unintended outcome of Ring may very well be to increase the effects of
defendant and victim race in those states that prior to Ring opted for
judicial sentencing in capital murder cases.
Having made these comments regarding the implications of the absence of ethnicity effects in the Nebraska data, I must qualify my
speculations with some warnings. The logic of the Baldus team's logistic regression approach is that with enough data, researchers can
take into account the effects of a large number of potentially confounding variables in a data base of measured predictors. Measuring
and statistically controlling for factors such as socioeconomic status of
the offenders, race of the victims, race of the defendants, levels of culpability, strength of aggravation, strength of mitigation, and a host of
other legal and extra-legal factors is limited by the ability of the researchers to anticipate potential confounds and to collect enough data
to provide the statistical tests with ample power and adequate stabil58. Wiener et al., supra note 35 (manuscript at Section II, on file with author).
59. Id.
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ity to control for them. As Professor Baldus points out, the sample
sizes in this study are relatively small compared to other studies that
applied this procedure (i.e., Georgia and Philadelphia).60 In fact there
were only twenty-nine death sentences imposed during the duration of
this study. Only seven of these defendants were minorities and just
two of them were executed or remain at risk of execution. Only fourteen White defendant cases ended in a death sentence and only five of
them were executed or remain at risk. It is difficult to use statistical
controls to reach definitive conclusions about racial bias with so few
cases sampling the various combinations of defendant race, victim
race, and sentencing outcome. In the final analysis it is true that
there is no evidence of racial discrimination in the Nebraska study,
but it is also the case that the analysis of bias would have been a great
6
deal more sensitive if more cases had been available for analysis. 1
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the end, the Baldus group's analysis of the disposition of capital
murder cases in Nebraska prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Ring v. Arizona 6 2 was a careful and thorough analysis of an archival
data set. It enjoys the ecological validity advantages of such an approach and it suffers from the internal validity and construct validity
problems of that research paradigm. Taking the strengths and weaknesses of this study together leads to the conclusion that these are
important data that should go a long way toward helping policymakers reform capital murder sentencing law to come into compliance
with the Sixth Amendment standard announced in Ring. From a social scientist's perspective, these valuable data shed a great deal of
light on the strengths and weaknesses ofjudicial sentencing. Furthermore, they may be among the last data sets collected on judicial decisionmaking in capital murder cases. I am grateful that Professor
Baldus and his colleagues went to such great lengths to collect and
analyze these cases and enrich our understanding in this important
area at the intersection of law and human behavior.

60. Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 535-36.
61. Id.
62. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).

